The author discusses the key arguments of the reasoning in the Supreme Court judgment of 2 July 2025 (case no. II CSKP 920/23) in the context of existing case law. The commentary is approving with respect to the Court’s recognition that the right to decide on the termination of pregnancy constitutes a subjective right enabling the exercise of the mother’s personal interest in decisional autonomy and freedom from the father’s interference. It also endorses the Court’s view that the failure to refer a pregnant woman for prenatal testing in certain circumstances constitutes a violation of both parents’ patients’ rights, namely, the right to information and the right to healthcare services, thereby entitling them to claim compensation for the harm suffered. However, the author is critical of the Court’s conclusion that recognizing that the child’s life, even in a particular state of health, does not constitute damage to the parents within the meaning of Article 361(1) and (2) of the Civil Code, simultaneously precludes the right to financial compensation for the parents’ non-pecuniary and pecuniary losses arising from the infringement of their personal rights. This critique is made in light of the Court’s further conclusion that a conflict of personal rights exists between the parents’ interests and the fetus’s interest in its life and health.